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Apr 25 2005
Simon Forrester, INTRAC Representative Office in Bishkek
5th April 2005
On 24th March 2005 a planned, peaceful demonstration, against what was seen as unfairly run Parliamentary elections, turned into a mass storming of the Presidential Administrative Offices (locally referred to as the White House), the fleeing of President Akaev, and the installation of a new set of political leaders in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to this there were several weeks of civil unrest most notably in the southern provinces of Osh and Jalalabad, in protest against seemingly ‘rigged elections’. This was succeeded by 48 hours of near anarchy in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, with businesses seen to have connections to the Akaev family ransacked and a frenzy of politicking amongst members of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Parliaments to find a legal solution to the sudden power vacuum.
For many external commentators the immediate response was to link the events in the Kyrgyz Republic to a sequence of ‘revolutions’ that had begun in Georgia, moved on to Ukraine, and were now seizing Central Asia. The driving force was seen as the global domino effect of democracy. But the democracy mantra and comparisons to Georgia and Ukraine obscure the dynamics of the change process in Kyrgyzstan and does little to contribute to an understanding of a growing and complex civil society within the country.
In Kyrgyzstan there has certainly been a degree of political mobilisation of opposition forces but the force is far less disciplined, there is no unifying leadership and no defined programmes. The forces for change in Kyrgyzstan are largely rural-based. The energy that culminated in the turmoil of 24th March comes from a rural population frustrated with pervasive government corruption and persistent poverty. Many people I have spoken to over the last few months have little to comment on the principles of democracy or the mechanisms for elections, but rather want more security for their families and more opportunities to drag themselves out of poverty.
The uncontrolled nature of the political disaffection in Kyrgyzstan is clearly a serious threat to stability in the country. The current new leadership has been quick to point out that they never expected to be in positions of power so quickly. When the big demonstration in Bishkek’s main square began to take shape on the morning of 24th, none of the then opposition leaders expected the day would end with the President in exile. No-one was ready for a transfer of power and now no-one is offering solutions as to how to regain a sense of political equilibrium. The leadership is made up of long-time political opponents to Akaev, thwarted in their efforts to be legitimately elected. Inter-ethnic tensions and competition amongst clans from different parts of the country have always figured in Kyrgyz society, and naturally now these tensions are being increasingly stressed and manipulated.
What part has been played by Kyrgyz civil society in the shaping of the political climate and the country’s future direction, and what analysis do civil society activists themselves contribute to an understanding of the current situation?
Clearly the influence of external support to fledgling civil society organisations (CSOs) in Kyrgyzstan cannot be ignored. Edil Baisolov, director of the NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, thinks that the material support provided to the Coalition through NDI (National Democratic Institute) has been crucial to the strengthening of the Coalition’s capacity to network and encourage debate (through roundtable type events and the publication of the Democrat newspaper.) The recent USAID funded work of Freedom House, enabling opposition media to get printed and distributed, has been a vital investment as far as Alexander Kim, editor of My Capital newspaper is concerned. Perhaps most significant has been the establishment of resource and information centres throughout the country, enabling activists and ordinary people to learn about and debate issues on rights and how to get organised. Work with political parties has been much less fruitful, with the drive for a multi-party system limited by local allegiance to personalities rather than parties and by the stop-start reform process of Parliament.
But civil society in Kyrgyzstan is much more than a collection of US-backed democracy projects. There are strong indigenous characteristics and an increasing variety of types of CSOs, with a creative and educated leadership, that has meant that the non-governmental sector in Kyrgyzstan is probably outstripping both the Government and the business sector in terms of credibility and capacity to innovate.
Emil Sultanbaev, Director of DCCA (Public Foundation for Development Cooperation in Central Asia), explains that the tensions in Kyrgyzstan are as a result of the unsustainable gap that exists between the rate of development of civil society and that of the Government; namely that expectations of those in civil society (previously strongly encouraged by Akaev’s politically liberal views) cannot be met within the existing administrative and economic environments propagated by Government.
Some of the leading national NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, such as Centre Interbilim and Foundation for Tolerance International, have been able to absorb external support and balance an appreciation of western democratic values with a localised approach to development issues. Both organisations have been at the forefront of opening up and protecting the space for debates on governance and civic participation. These leading NGOs have also played a significant role in issues on accountability and assisting in the analysis and dissemination of lessons learnt from accountability activities.
As an indicator of their adherence to the promotion of flows of and access to information, it is noteworthy that just three days after the ‘regime change’ in Kyrgyzstan, those NGOs most vocal in their opposition to the closed nature of Akaev’s Government, were lobbying the new political leadership to rise to the challenge of openness. Seven prominent NGOs (including Interbilim, FTI and the Coalition) met on 30th March and discussed their concerns that now that the ‘opposition’ was in power, that they would close ranks and stifle debate. The NGOs’ response was to maintain their challenge to the media to remain open and to call for an NGO Forum to debate the wider civil society role in the new era of Kyrgyz politics.
In the aftermath of the actions on 24th March, access to information and maintaining the space for debate has been one of the major concerns of international civil society groups working in Kyrgyzstan. At an informal meeting of nine INGOs on 29th March (facilitated by INTRAC), all representatives acknowledged that the indigenous CSOs had made a powerful contribution in building up networks to allow for information to be more widely shared and debated. And that it would be an ‘acid test’ for these groups to protect that space in the days, weeks and months to come.
Quite apart from the more visible and measurable efforts of CSOs in Kyrgyzstan, is the linkage that recognised civil society groups may or may not have with the ‘greyer’ areas of the civil (or un-civil) society. There is much hearsay that elements within the Akaev opposition have been assisted by alliances with mafia gangs and drug barons. Many local observers have commented that the lack of any violence or vandalism in Kyrgyzstan’s second city, Osh, was due to the fact that the political opposition asked for some ‘controlling measures’ to be taken by the local mafia boss. There is also much unsubstantiated talk of the influence of radical Islamic groups. Certainly the example of nearby Afghanistan demonstrates how such forces can thrive in uncertain political environments and on the despair brought on by poverty, so it is important that CSOs voice concern and ensure this is an agenda item discussed with care. Some NGOs, like DCCA, who have solid working relationships with grassroots religious groups, are sounding alarm bells that elements of the new political leadership are promoting prominent Islamic figures into positions in a previously secular administration.
The final aspect of civil society’s role in the ongoing change process in Kyrgyzstan is the almost unfathomable relationship that the clan structures have with it and the dynamics generated by such a relationship. For many observers the unrest in Kyrgyzstan has been neither a political revolution nor a people’s revolution, but rather a ‘clan coup’, with one powerful, clan-related interest group merely replacing another one on the wane. This analysis echoes the picture of civil society in Kyrgyzstan sketched by INTRAC’s local researchers in 2002, which concluded that from one perspective Kyrgyz civil society was defined by the clan groupings found in the six main valleys of the country. In this respect it could be claimed that the Chui and Talas Valleys clans (those that traditionally have their roots in areas around Bishkek and in Talas Oblast, birth place of respectively Akaev and his wife Mairam) have given way to the clans of the Ferghana Valley (birth place of the interim Prime Minister and acting President, Kurmanbek Bakiev.)