In recent years the subfield of political anthropology, NGO-graphy (i.e., the ethnography of NGOs), has dramatically expanded as anthropologists have begun to examine the work of NGOs in development and transition country contexts. The anthropological study of NGOs as well as civil society more broadly enriches our understandings of how knowledge and information is produced, the flow of ideas and the adaptation of metadiscourses to local contexts and how these effect decision-making. Anthropological studies in post-socialist states have examined the perils of importing and imposing western models and understandings of concepts such as civil society and democracy on the former Eastern bloc, revealing the moments of rift, dissonance, and disjuncture. Such studies are important because in spite of the problems of defining and locating civil society in the West, in the 1990s the idea became a central part of Western aid programs to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as donors embraced the idea of civil society development as critical to democratization and “successful transition.”

This became a new mantra in both aid and diplomatic circles and civil society came to equated with the development and growth of NGOs. Policy makers hailed NGOs as “stakeholders in the transition and development of these countries” and the “connective tissue of democratic political culture.”

I have been conducting research on NGOs in Armenia since 1996. My research with women's/human rights NGOs as well as with US, European, and diaspora donors who fund NGO projects, Armenian government officials who work with NGOs, intended beneficiaries, and oligarchs (i.e., the people donors see as naturally assuming philanthropic roles) is aimed at trying to better understand the multiple perspectives, discourses, and strategies of the various actors, the relationships between these actors, and how the foreign aid has affected the development of civil society and democracy in Armenia. Based on this research, in this talk, I will address the following questions: What are the implications of attempting to manufacture or create civil society from above in a post-socialist context? And, to what degree does the growth of civil society depend on a country's historical, socio-economic, cultural and political context? The implications of the asymmetrical relationships between local NGO members and donors and their flown-in experts cannot be overlooked given that the power inequalities inherent in these encounters affect the production of knowledge, the definition of problems, the circulation of information, decision-making, and the outcomes of development or “transition” projects and how civil society is conceptualised and operationalised.

Prior to addressing these questions I will briefly outline the rise of the NGO sector in Armenia.

The Emergence of Armenia's NGO Sector and Its Characteristics

The Karabagh Movement, which began in February 1988 and culminated in the declaration of Armenia’s independence in September 1991, has been called a renaissance of
the Armenian people. That was a period when Armenians believed in the ideals of civil society and the possibility of democratising the Soviet system. This idealism brought hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of the capital Yerevan and made social and political activists out of many apathetic Soviet citizens. This idealism and social activism were short-lived and were soon replaced by disillusion, apathy, frustration, and dislocation as Armenia was plunged into a severe period of crisis immediately following independence. Given these harsh socio-economic conditions in the early post-Soviet years; most people did not have the time or inclination to participate in civic projects. As in Soviet times, the extended family continued to be the primary mode of social protection and form of identification and advancement.6

While following independence, foreign, as well as diaspora organizations were quite numerous in Armenia, there were only forty-four local NGOs operating in 1994.7 This quickly changed when; beginning that year, foreign donors began providing grants to NGOs in Armenia. As a result, today there are 3450 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Justice Armenia’s population is by official estimates 3.5 million. The majority of these NGOs are NGOs in name only. One need only scan the lists of grant awardees that are posted on donor websites to realize that time and again the same organizations are awarded grants, and that only a handful are operating with any consistency. The opening of the USAID-funded NGO Training and Resource Centre (NGOC) in Yerevan in 19948 was the watershed event that led to the phenomenal growth in the number of NGOs. The NGOs that attended the Centre’s training seminars not only learned how to write grant proposals and how to approach donors, but most importantly, they began to master “NGO-speak.” This has become an indispensable skill as NGO members have discovered the importance of using certain key words and phrases (“advocacy,” “social partnerships,” “synergy,” “democracy is the road to development”) in their grant proposals to present their organization and project(s) as a good match with the funding priorities of donors.

NGOs occupy a difficult middle position in that they are constantly working in and between the local and global levels. As intermediaries NGOs benefit from foreign aid because it provides them with increased leverage and autonomy at the local level and an ability to continue working in respectable jobs instead of having to do menial, humiliating (by local standards) work.9 Aid, however is a double-edged sword, and while it provides NGOs with funding and support it also exposes them to foreign direction and control. This dependency of local NGOs on the “uncertain largess of donors,” as William Fisher calls it, has direct and indirect consequences. He describes these as a) redirecting the accountability toward funders and away from the group’s grassroots constituencies and b) transforming NGOs into contractors, constituencies into customers, and members into clients.10 This tendency has exposed Armenian NGOs to attacks raising questions about whether they truly represent their constituents. If they sacrifice the local for the global, then they are betraying their mission as local organizations. If they ignore the needs and wants of international donors, they risk losing funding that is critical to their survival and success. The issue of domestic violence, which became a popular funding initiative among donors during the late 1990s, illustrates this dilemma.

**Is the Personal Political? Exporting the Domestic Violence Issue**

Domestic violence was not an issue that was readily identified by local women or NGOs in the mid-1990s. Indeed, it was not a publicly discussed issue in Armenia before the arrival of feminist activists and Western consultants who introduced the idea that domestic violence is a public problem which must be addressed with the cooperation of law enforcement and judicial bodies. To be clear, I am not arguing that domestic violence does not occur in Armenia. Nor am I saying that individual Armenian women and men are not concerned or that they should not be concerned about it. Rather, I mean that it was not locally recognized as a public issue that could be addressed (solved?) with the creation of crisis shelters and hotlines and the
intervention of law enforcement officials, until it was identified as such by Western donors and “experts.” By examining how domestic violence became an issue, I will show how the existing asymmetrical NGO-donor relationships shape knowledge-production, information-circulation, and decision-making.

When I was conducting my dissertation research in 1996 – 97 domestic violence was still a new and to some extent a taboo subject. Women’s NGOs opposed public discussion of what they deemed a private issue and rejected efforts by a transnational NGO and an American expatriate at addressing the issue by arguing, “We don’t air our dirty laundry in public.” This situation changed in 1999 – 2000 when substantial, $25,000 – 100,000, grants were made available by donors for addressing this problem.

Most recently, in September 2002 the USAID office in Armenia granted $476,367 US to six local NGOs to address domestic violence. This is an unprecedented event. Prior to the direct grant, the US-based World Learning awarded grants to nine Armenian NGOs for addressing the problem of domestic violence. While until 2000 only 2 NGO had been working on domestic violence issues in Armenia, when World Learning announced its grant program, over 130 NGOs applied. With these grants four crisis shelters have opened in Armenia. In addition, 6 hotlines are now operating in these locations during the day and evening hours. The shelters provide 2 – 4 weeks housing for women who leave their abusers and the hotlines provide psychological counseling and advice. These approaches, while perhaps successful in the West, have not been effective methods for addressing the problem in Armenia and I will explain why.

1. Family Traditions

First, in Armenia, family is seen as sacred and the private realm is seen as in need of protection from government intervention, not in need of increased intervention. Armenian anthropologist Levon Abrahamian contends that in Armenia very often the “family” is seen as assisting the Armenian “nation” to survive. The family he argues has often been seen as a substitute for the state because Armenia has been stateless for many centuries.

In this context where the family is seen as sacred and as the foundation of the nation, anti-family ideologies or actions are considered anti-national. While some American feminists working with Armenians recognize that domestic violence formerly was a “private” issue in the US, they underestimate the historical, cultural, and social differences that determine how issues are addressed and resolved in different societies. For many women in post-socialist countries, the American feminist slogan the “personal is political” is alarming because it sounds as if it will bring not only politics but also the government into the family inviting surveillance, corruption, and humiliation into the home. This is especially true in the former Soviet states, where during the seventy years of Soviet rule the authorities unsuccessfully attempted to “break the cake of custom” and to replace the loyalty of individuals to the family with loyalty to the state and Party. In Armenia, these efforts began in the early 1920s the Soviet Armenian leadership created the Women’s Division of the Communist Party, the Kinbazhin. During the 1920s Kinbazhin workers would select representatives (delegatki) who would visit homes and give women “scientific” advice on how to raise children and on simple rules of hygiene. These delegatki would also try to establish rapport with the children of the household and encourage them to report cases of child beating, wife beating, and forced marriages, which Mary Kilbourne Matossian argues, had “immense potentialities for disrupting traditional family patterns.” In addition to Kinbazhin, the Commission for the Improvement of the Way of Life of Women was created in 1923 to “advise government organs, conduct propaganda campaigns, offer legal advice to women, and provide an ‘inspection service’ to see that Soviet legislation regarding the family and traditional offenses was put into effect.” During the seventy years of Soviet rule such practices were resented and resisted with the paradoxical effect of strengthening family
and kinship networks. Family not only became a mode of resistance to the state, but also remained and continues to be the primary means of identification, support, and advancement. 20

2. Infrastructure

The second reason why solutions, such as telephone hotlines and shelters, proposed by foreign consultants are not practical and effective in Armenia is that they do not take into account the socio-economic and infrastructural limitations in Armenia. Hotlines are not successful in Armenia because phone lines do not work properly, because making local calls is expensive, and because many of the most vulnerable and poorest women do not even have phones in their homes. Shelters, meanwhile, are ineffective because the Armenian government cannot provide adequate public assistance, health insurance, and subsidized housing, for women who leave their husbands and who have no other means of support. Furthermore, there is a 20% rate of unemployment in Armenia and women are 70% of those unemployed. All that a crisis shelter can do in Armenia is to provide counselling, which itself is a highly suspect approach to solving problems. Many of the NGO members who are working in the shelter programs are concerned about the infinitesimal number of battered women 21 that take advantage of their services and about the sustainability of these shelters once the funding from USAID runs out in October 2004.

3. Law Enforcement and Corruption

The final recommendation of donors deals with legal reforms and trainings of law enforcement officials. According to several recent studies conducted by Armenian anthropologists, law enforcement officials in Armenia are perceived as corrupt racketeers who prey on the weak and unprotected sectors of society. Human rights NGO members I have spoken with expressed concern that people will be afraid of allowing the police into their homes since they will most likely be opening the door for abuse and extortion. In this context, how is it that any kind of “training” seminar for law enforcement officials will change attitudes and responses? 22 And yet, a three-day training seminar was held for police officials at the OSCE offices in Armenia from June 24 – 26, 2003 to “enable Armenian police officers to more efficiently combat domestic violence.” 23 In response to the police training, the AybFe opposition paper wrote,

In Armenia the problem needs to be solved in a specific way. Armenians will still avoid appealing to the police over the violence in families. Nothing will change in the Armenian families, as neither an Armenian woman nor other family members will ever call the police to accuse their relative. 24

Shushan Matevosssian, a journalist for the pro-government paper, Hayots Ashkhar wrote,

These international organizations are making us angry as they widen their scope of work day by day. First they poked their noses into our bedrooms and private lives under the guise of “family planning,” next they began to tell us what to do regarding “violence against women” and trafficking. And now, the matter has come down to “family violence” and the role of the police in this matter. But in truth, this is just another opportunity for some people to “snatch” grants and to enrich themselves.

Donors consider domestic violence and now, increasingly, sexual trafficking as important issues and local NGOs acquiesce in order to get the funds. And precisely because the issue of domestic violence as well as the solutions do not resonate with local NGO actors as much as they do with donors, when donors’ agendas shift, local NGOs will abandon domestic violence in favour of newer funding priorities. This situation exists in other republics of the former Soviet Union. For example, Julie Hemmment describes how members of the Russian women’s NGO Zhenskii Svet were concerned that funders were moving away from supporting the theme of
violence and toward the new theme, trafficking, and explains their frustration of having “to be like chameleons” to keep up with the changing demands and funding priorities of donors. Discussing international donors’ interest in addressing sexual trafficking and domestic violence in Georgia, Lara Olson writes, “While these are very serious problems, many local women activists do not see them as the key issues for women in Georgian society.”

This not to say that there is no problem of domestic violence in Armenia, because there is, but rather to emphasize the need to identify local approaches and solutions. Members of local NGOs argue that these are symptoms of more fundamental problems in Armenian society, including unemployment, poverty, lack of affordable housing, and the disruption of society, communities, and families caused by the mass emigration of Armenians who are fleeing Armenia in search of jobs and wages. The Akunk Centre for Ethnosociological Studies conducted research in the different regions of Armenia using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies from September 2001 – March 2002. A ten-person team led by ethno-sociologist Mihran Galstyan, interviewed 2715 respondents. The majority of those surveyed said that the primary causes of violence were the difficult socio-economic conditions (57.3%) and the cramped living conditions (25.6%) in Armenia. The overwhelming majority of respondents identified the improvement of socio-economic conditions in Armenia as the best method (86.8%) of addressing domestic violence as compared to the 3.1% of respondents who identified shelters as an appropriate approach. The Akunk researchers argue that the problems of domestic violence and trafficking should not be addressed in isolation. But because the Akunk report is in Armenian, it is unlikely than donors have read the report that they commissioned. Many human rights NGO members I interviewed consider these approaches as “incompatible,” “unviable,” and “imitation or charades” because it is unclear what will happen to a woman once she must leave the shelter? Those I interviewed argue that the money that was given to shelter and hotline programs would have been better spent on creating vocational training, micro-credit, jobs creation as well as anger management and conflict resolution programs that will provide greater options for victims of violence.

If NGOs for reasons of economic dependency are compelled to address issues that are deemed important by donors, to keep up constantly with the shifting demands of these donors, and to address issues in the paradigms and methods suggested by donors, will they ever be able to meet the needs of their local constituents? It is unlikely. If the situation continues unchanged, it will bring local NGOs into disrepute, because, in order to keep up with the demands of donors, they must shift priorities and address issues not recognized locally as being of the utmost importance. This tendency will intensify the existing disillusion with democratisation and civil society, and will increase the emerging corruption (grant-eating) in the sector.

Conclusion

Armenia's NGO sector in the 1990s was and still is shaped by donor initiatives and by funding strategies. The elite-centrism of Western donors has selected the type of people who establish and operate NGOs; donor-sponsored training seminars have taught and prepared NGOs to discuss the topics of interest to donors (e.g., gender mainstreaming, advocacy, trafficking) and to use the same languages (linguistic and discursive) as donors. On the other hand, NGO members, while affected by the policies and strategies of donors, are not passive consumers; they are cultural interpreters who customize global discourses and projects to better serve local needs.

Is it then possible to so arrange matters that local NGOs will be able to cut down on the “customizing” and straightforwardly address local concerns? Yes, but the mechanisms for this are still in the nascent stages of development. Armenian NGOs and government officials who work with NGOs are currently discussing and considering ways how NGOs can be more locally sustainable and legitimate in society. For this to occur, they maintain that there needs to be
more transparency, sharing of information, multi-level cooperation (NGO-government, NGO-NGO, NGO-society), accountability to beneficiaries, and real dialogue with donors if NGOs are to play a more significant role in society. My on-going research with US, European, and diaspora donors, government officials, and oligarchs is aimed at trying to better understand the multiple perspectives, discourses, and strategies of the various actors, the process of aid and NGO development, and the nature of NGO-donor relationships. From a social policy perspective, this work is intended to identify ways in which the voices of those who are being “developed” or “democratised” will be heard and to assist those who are involved in the design and implementation of NGO projects be they public health, human rights, or democracy building ones, to find methods that are more sustainable, compatible, and viable in the locations where they are implemented. Ethnographic methods can assist in identifying the best local means of addressing problems that are global in scope and nature.
in Armenia. The six local NGOs that received grants from USAID are the “Helsinki Association,” “Maternity Fund,” “Women’s Rights Center,” “Ajakits,” “Martuni Women’s Community Council,” and “Armenian Caritas.” The grants, according to USAID, “will allow these NGOs to expand and enhance services that they already provide, and in some cases allow them to organize shelters for victims of domestic violence and their minor-age family members. Other services include court monitoring and training for lawyers and judges, public awareness campaigns and the promotion of alternatives to violence.” Available from <http://www.usaid.gov/am/pr10_02_DV.html>.

1 For a longer version of this paper see, Ishkanian, Armine “Is the Personal Political? How Domestic Violence Became an Issue in Armenia’s NGO Sector in the Late 1990s” (June 1, 2003). Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. Available at: http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseeses/bps/2003_03-ishk

2 The term “transition” has been problematized by various scholars including Michael Buroway, Katherine Verdery, and Barbara Einhorn who argue that “transition” implies an evolutionary development that has a single, well-defined objective and trajectory.


6 According to the 1996 UNDP Armenia Human Development Report, in 1995 nearly one out of five registered residents of Armenia was living abroad temporarily or permanently and that every fifth family out of 1000 families interviewed reported having received assistance from relatives and friends in the previous month. These remittances have helped tens of thousands of Armenian families survive the difficult economic conditions in Armenia. On average, during the 1990s Armenians living abroad sent around 350 million US dollars annually to family and friends in the homeland. In 1998, this figure represented almost nineteen percent of the GDP ($1.85 billion) in Armenia. From the Armenpress report, “$350 Million Enters Armenia As Financial Aid to Some Armenian Residents,” 1 December 1997, cited in Astourian, Stephan. From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia.” (Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, 2001), p. 42. However, because the hundreds of millions of dollars were sent in $100 - $500 increments by over 700,000 people a month, the impact of remittances on the Armenian economy has been negligible. Most recipients have used the remittances to survive from one month to the next; they have not been able to save the remittances in order to invest in business ventures that would provide longer-term earnings.


11 USAID awarded a total of $476,367 US to six Armenian NGOs, to support services for victims of domestic violence. According to a USAID Mission to Armenia press release from 18 October 2002, “These grants are the first direct USAID grants to local Armenian organizations for activities in Armenia. The grants will allow the NGOs to provide safe and adequate shelters, support, counseling and other services to victims of domestic violence throughout Armenia.” The six local NGOs that received grants from USAID are the “Helsinki Association,” “Maternity Fund,” “Women’s Rights Center,” “Ajakits,” “Martuni Women’s Community Council,” and “Armenian Caritas.” The grants, according to USAID, “will allow these NGOs to expand and enhance services that they already provide, and in some cases allow them to organize shelters for victims of domestic violence and their minor-age family members. Other services include court monitoring and training for lawyers and judges, public awareness campaigns and the promotion of alternatives to violence.” Available from <http://www.usaid.gov/am/about/about.html>.

12 World Learning, a US-based organization that was founded in 1932, received a cooperative agreement from USAID to implement the four-year NGO Strengthening Program in Armenia. According to the World Learning website, “Together with its partners, IESC (International Executive Service Corps), MSI (Management Systems International), and ICNL (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law), World Learning assists in the development of the NGO sector in Armenia. The program aims at building the capacity of NGOs throughout Armenia to help them to deliver services in a more efficient manner and become better and more articulate advocates for their constituents.” World Learning, Armenia NGO Strengthening Program, “About Us”; available from <http://www.worldlearning.am/about/about.html>.

13 Ibid., p. 123.

14 Fraser, Nancy. “The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist Politics,” in Boundary 2, (Summer 1990). Fraser argues that even in the US, feminists had an uphill struggle in making domestic violence a public issue. She writes, “Until recently, feminists were in the minority in thinking that domestic violence was a matter
of common concern and thus a legitimate topic of public discourses. The great majority of people considered this issue to be a private matter between what was assumed to be a fairly small number of heterosexual couples."

In the American context this motto has a different meaning and challenges patriarchal notions of what is appropriate and legitimate for public discussion.


Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 66.

Ibid., p. 67.


As of May 2002, the Maternity Fund of Armenia shelter in Yerevan has had ten clients and the Gyumri Armenian Caritas shelter has had six clients. I plan visit the Martuni shelter to interview members about their work. The Women’s Rights Center (WRC), meanwhile, prohibits visits to its the shelter in Yerevan and the WRC President does not disclose statistical information about the number of clients that have visited the WRC shelter.

One need only drive anywhere in Armenia to realize how corrupt traffic police are; even if a driver has obeyed all the rules of the road a traffic officer (GAI) may pull the driver over and either ask nicely for a bribe or threaten to confiscate the driver’s license if the driver does not pay the appropriate “tariff” (dugank). These tariffs are usually between 500 and 2000 drams (between $1 and $3.50) depending on the mood of the GAI and the number of people with whom he has to “share” his takings. On a recent trip from Yerevan to Tsakhkadzor, our taxi was stopped three times by GAI officers in the cities of Abovian, Hrazdan, and Tsakhkadzor, even though our driver was obeying all rules of the road. Before we reached our destination the driver ended up paying 3000 drams (approximately $5.50) to three different GAI at 1000 drams per officer.


http://www.a1plus.am/eng/?goto=news&id=3840


While there are no official figures, it is commonly acknowledged by most scholars that that since 1991, at least 500,000 and quite possibly as many as 1 million Armenians (out of a total population of almost 3.7 million in 1990) have left Armenia. It is difficult to estimate the actual number of people since many migrants leave Armenia through illegal means and do not register their departure with the appropriate government agencies. Available from the International Organization of Migration web page - Irregular Migration and Smuggling of Migrants from Armenia <http://www.iom.int//DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/armenia_trafficking.pdf>, p. 8.

Mihran Galstyan. Undanekan Brrnutuiuneruh Hayastanoom: sociologiakan hedazoottoooyoon (Domestic Violence in the Republic of Armenia: A Sociological Survey). (Yerevan: Zangak Press, 2002), p. 43. This project was sponsored with a grant from World Learning. Aside from Mihran Galstyan, the team included two other ethno-sociologists, five anthropologists, one conflictologist, and a folklorist.

Ibid, p. 84.

Bribes are called kashark in Armenian, and corruption is known as “bribe consumption” or “bribe eating” (kasharakerutiun). Grantakerutiun is another form of corruption and can be seen as the continuation of the kasharakerutiun that began during Soviet times and continues unchecked today.